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Abstract 
Commercial Air Service Agreements remain the overwhelming focus when it comes to assessing 
the degree of liberalisation and deregulation in air transport markets. If individual countries are 
assessed for levels of traffic growth, competition and overall competitiveness, it becomes clear 
that there is a wide range of policy levers that can restrict markets but go way beyond the realms 
of official Air Service Agreements. This study provides a fresh holistic view of policy barriers 
restricting growth in world air transport markets by assessing non-ASA policies affecting the airline 
sector directly as well as levels of (de)regulation in the related airport sector. A selection of case 
countries provides evidence that if traffic growth, competition and resultant consumer welfare as 
a result of overall competitiveness are the objective functions of policy-makers, it is advisable for 
states to create much more comprehensive commercial air policy frameworks and more holistic 
measures/indices by which to benchmark levels of policy ‘liberalness’. 
Key words: Air Policy, Air Service Agreements, Commercial policies, Air Liberalization Index (ALI), 
air transport markets 
 
1. Introduction 
By 2016, the number of official Air Service Agreements (ASAs) between World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) members, guiding the provision of commercial air transport services worldwide had 
reached over 1,830 between 160 signatory states (ASAP, 2016). Using a WTO Secretariat devised 
measure of air liberalisation (the Weighted Air Liberalisation Index or WALI), the average degree of 
freedom within these ASAs was only 15.5 out of a maximum scope of 50 or to put it another way 
many additional steps towards liberalisation could still be taken between the WTOs many member 
states despite concerted efforts at national and international level to allow the world’s airlines to 
operate free of market distorting policy restrictions. Aside from this seemingly lacklustre global 
effort towards full liberalisation between WTO member states, this study aims to highlight a set of 
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additional gaps both in the way commercial air transport liberalisation is assessed and in the 
uncertainty surrounding the true level of freedom that the world’s commercial air carriers are 
subject to on an on-going basis. 
Historically ASAs have covered important policy levers such as the granting of traffic rights, 
statements on capacity and tariff restrictions, carrier designation rules and in a lower number of 
cases, guidelines in relation to the ability for carriers to enter into cooperative arrangements and 
cross-border ownership, the last one being particularly relevant in today’s global drive towards 
various forms of airline consolidation. Less common still within ASAs are statements specifically 
aimed at cargo only operators. The status quo regulatory framework relevant to cargo only 
operators as well as other major aviation supply chain players such as airports, ground handlers, 
manufacturers and Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) is much less clear with the level of 
underlying restrictions on such sub-sectors and the resulting competition effects currently very 
fragmented at best and at worst foggy and ambiguous, which can be unhelpful in a what is an 
intrinsically global industry with extremely high levels of cross-border activity. Even in the case of 
ASAs there is still a degree of uncertainty around the number of “unused” traffic rights and the 
prevalence of “orphan” services; i.e. services that are permitted to operate without an overriding 
ASA (extra-bilateral negotiations and MoUs) (OECD, 2010). Data quality on official ASAs between 
non-member states of WTO as well as on members of ICAO that have not properly updated the 
body’s World Air Service Agreement Database also add to the lack of clarity on the true level of 
openness guidelines the worlds air transport industry. 
Last but not least there is the issue of non-ASA related regulations and policies that may or may 
not hinder the pursuit of purely commercial air transport operations or at the very least provide 
an additional cost or time/knowledge barrier to free market entry and exit. Such regulations could 
be unilateral (i.e. pertinent to one jurisdiction only) as is the case with an individual country’s 
provision of subsidy to individual carriers, for instance or multilateral as illustrated by the well-
known European Union rules around the allocation of airport slots or passenger rights, for 
example. It must be noted that the level of harmonisation and standardisation in relation to safety 
and technical policies worldwide, though not perfect, is at a much more advanced stage than 
commercial air policy harmonisation/standardisation, largely due to the ease with which the 
world’s jurisdictions have been able to come to consensus arrangements on air safety issues 
together with the supra-national efforts of ICAO and to a lesser degree IATA over many decades.   
The paper continues with an in-depth overview of commercial air policy literature to date (section 
2), the selection of case countries for policy analysis in section 3, the results in terms of policy gaps 
and unknowns as highlighted in the case country examples (section 4) before section 5 concludes. 
2. Review of literature on commercial air policy to date 
There is already a plethora of literature on air transport liberalisation and deregulation from a 
wide range of academic and non-academic sources (namely Oum, Button, Gillen, ICAO, IATA, EC, 
Booz Allen, Intervistas etc.). The remaining gaps are largely centred on scoping and geographical 
omissions. The scoping gaps revolve around the non-inclusion of artificial or non-Air Service 
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Agreement barriers to trade in air services in liberalisation and deregulation assessments that are 
designed to give an overall measure of the degree of liberalness or deregulation. This can be 
troublesome when such assessments are then used to measure the impact of policy on air traffic, 
costs, revenues, customer service and efficiency inter alia. Arguably some of the biggest barriers 
to effective market freedom come from the aviation supply chain. Examples include airlines 
gaining access to competitive airport and ground handling services. Both of these sub-sectors are 
not covered by official Air Service Agreements and are instead treated unilaterally (or in the case 
of the European Union multilaterally) in terms of the degree of permitted competition and entry 
barriers in these supplier markets. Equally Airport and handlers among other suppliers play no 
official part in ASA negotiations even though they are materially affected by them and also create 
effective barriers to entry if moves towards liberalisation are not coordinated between them 
(ICAO, 2003). 
 
The second continued area of omission relates to geographical regions with fewer studies 
completed to date on parts of Africa, the Middle-East, the Caribbean and Latin America, emerging 
economies and Oceania, though there have been some studies of late dealing with a narrow ASA 
centred definition of commercial air policy (Njoya, 2016, United Nations ECLAC, 2015, Warnock-
Smith and Morrell, 2008 and Sihna, 2001). In such geographical regions it is also difficult to 
examine the long-term impact of moves towards deregulation and liberalisation due to the 
narrower time frame available and smaller number of observable markets in which truly ‘liberal’ 
air policies have existed. 
One of the recent criticisms of liberalisation and deregulation assessments has been rather static, 
one-dimensional way in which policy itself has been treated with simple before and after 
dichotomous measures deemed to be the most appropriate way to measure the impact of moving 
to more ‘open’ air transport markets. This weakness led to a spate of recent studies including 
Gillen et al. (1999), Warnock-Smith and Morrell (2008), WTO (2008), Surovitskikh (2015) and 
others that adopted an ordinal level ranking of air service agreements and policy lever weighting 
which developed into a WTO housed Air Liberalisation Index (ALI). 
Another continued grey area relates to the relationship between domestic and international 
liberalisation and deregulation of air transport markets. Studies often focus on one or the other 
rather than both at the same time, leading to missed opportunities to analyse how domestic and 
international air policies interact (e.g. domestic liberalisation as an important precursor to 
international liberalisation as in the case of the United States). Domestic protectionism can often 
lead to international and intercontinental market distortions, for example, if carriers are not 
permitted to fly customers on to their final destination or from the true origin point due to 
domestic barriers to entry. This is very much the case today in countries such as India, the United 
States, and Russia where at times even national but privately owned carriers face entry barriers 
never mind the provision of traffic rights to foreign based carriers. In India, for instance, there has 
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been a long standing 5/20 rule preventing nationally registered carriers from operating 
international flights until they are at least five year old and have 20 aircraft (Matthews, 2016). 
Use of the term deregulation in the same breath as liberalisation is also problematic. Liberalisation 
of air transport markets can occur, for instance, with the effective broad removal of barriers (e.g. 
additional traffic rights negotiation with bilateral ASAs) but a myriad of soft and sometimes hard 
regulatory barriers remain (IATA, 2007), which creep in from the safety/technical side (e.g. EU 
airline blacklist) or the competition regulations side (e.g. antitrust regulations or similar). The 
distinction of these two terms is important to ensure assessments do not fall into the same one-
dimensional trap. 
The way the Air Cargo industry is affected by moves towards liberalisation and deregulation is also 
given quite short shrift in the literature. It is often unclear in official air service agreements, for 
instance, if cargo only carriers from designating states have access to the same traffic rights that 
are made available to passenger only or combination carriers. In a 2002 paper, Zhang and Zhang 
stated that all-cargo carriers tend to push separate traffic rights given that the existing traffic 
rights embedded into bilateral Air Service Agreements are based on passenger focussed principles 
of traffic carriage reciprocity, which is difficult to achieve in freight markets. To date no separate 
package of traffic rights have ever been put forward by IATA. 
3. Selection of case countries 
Due to the continued fragmentation of commercial air policy worldwide, selection of illustrative 
examples is important as any combination of examples can lead researchers to derive different 
results. The purpose of case selection in this study, however, is merely to highlight the 
complexities and practical difficulties that can arise as a result of disjointed policy-making as a way 
of highlighting the need for researchers, policy-makers and industry to work together to fill the 
remaining gaps and omissions as soon as possible in order to create a clearer more workable 
framework for air carriers worldwide. Selection was therefore based on having access to published 
ASA and non-ASA commercial policy data as well as data pertaining to the ASA and non-ASA 
barriers that airlines operating in such case countries face on an on-going basis. In an effort to help 
plug the continued geographical gap in air transport liberalisation research, one understudied case 
country was selected along with one well-studied country. The following two countries were 
therefore selected: 
1. United Kingdom 
2. Tanzania 
The United Kingdom is a good case country to select as it is a mature market, not as disjointed in 
terms of air policy as some states but nevertheless subject to ambiguities and discrepancies in 
market access that carriers serving the UK have to deal with. It is also possible to take a longer 
term view of the impact fragmented commercial air policy can have on the development of air 
traffic which may well have taken a different pathway with full market openness over the 
observable period. Tanzania was selected as the under-studied case country. Unlike the United 
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Kingdom ,Tanzania is in a growth/infancy stage of air traffic development and also at an earlier 
stage of commercial air policy development, though in effect carriers are still subject to a large 
number of policy discrepancies and ambiguities as in the UK case. 
4. Results 
4.1 United Kingdom 
The UK has officially taken a liberal approach towards commercial air services and has played its 
full part in the creation of a Single Aviation Market in Europe. It has also taken a liberal stance 
towards negotiating with non-EU countries. According to the ASAP database the UK is party to 96 
separate bilateral agreements in addition to its multilateral participation in the European Single 
Aviation Market (a further 28 countries). Aside from the liberal approach to traffic rights within 
Europe the overall Air Liberalisation Index is relatively low for the UK coming out at 14.3 out of a 
possible 50. Individual agreements range from ‘truly liberal’ as is the case with the UK-Singapore 
ASA signed in 2007 (ALI = 50) to ‘restrictive’ as is the case with the UK-Barbados bilateral ASA (ALI 
= 8). 
4.1.1. Inconsistency examples 
Perhaps the most well publicised contradiction in UK aviation policy over the last 40 years has 
been successive governments’ approaches towards the provision of airport capacity. Despite 
embarking on an unprecedented airport privatisation process starting in the 1980’s, airport 
capacity expansion has remained restricted and subject to government approval. Airports located 
in the South-East of England have been particularly restricted in this regard despite all commercial 
airports in the South-East being in private hands. Various justifications can be put forward as to 
why seemingly necessary airport expansion has been blocked, but the implications for airlines and 
users nevertheless remain significant (see below section 4.1.2). As noted in the current UK 
Aviation Policy Framework (2013), the Civil Aviation Authority has powers to influence and control 
the commercial behaviour of the air transport sector. In practice they have particularly focussed 
on airports which have had a powerful indirect effect on airline operations. Current airport 
charging regulations at London Heathrow and Gatwick, though sincere in trying to prevent any 
anti-competitive airport behaviour, have in themselves risked distorting natural market entry and 
exit by airlines wishing to serve these airports at a higher price point and by implication higher 
service level. A third area of possible contradiction is that of Airport Performance Charters. With 
its vested powers, the CAA directed airports, particularly in the South-East of England, to assess 
the feasibility of developing guidelines that might optimise utilisation of runway resources at 
airports. The example given in the UK’s Aviation Policy Framework (2013) is that of the Heathrow 
airport community, who in 2012 agreed a winter schedule with a lower hourly capacity limit to 
improve reliability. Again, though the intention of such policies and directives might be genuine, 
such measures still constitute market interference, creating barriers to entry for carriers who may 




4.1.2. Implications for air carriers and examples 
In the case of UK airport capacity, there have been two major impact areas for airlines; the first 
has been the stifling knock-on effect in obtaining convenient and costless slots. At the end of a 
long line of extortionate, Oman Air recently agreed to pay a record US$75mn for a pair of take-off 
and landing slots at London Heathrow (Sunday Times, 2016). The proceeds of the sale went 
straight to incumbent carrier Air France-KLM, with Oman Air still subject to the regular 
aeronautical fees charged by Heathrow airport. It is important to note that even if Oman Air or 
carriers from other states have the traffic rights to serve points in the United Kingdom, the 
expense of serving the lucrative London market effectively acts as a barrier to entry for many 
carriers, especially smaller airlines that may offer good niche products but are unable to make 
such high one-off payments for grey market slots.  
The second major implication has been for airline operating performance at capacity congested 
airports. Figure 1 shows there has been a clear impact from continued government capacity 
restrictions on airline operating performance at South-East airport, though for the Year 2015 
London Heathrow airlines performed better than Manchester and Glasgow. The bottom three 
airports are all located in the restricted South-East, however. International gateways such as 
Tokyo Haneda and Atlanta, not subject to such prolonged capacity restrictions achieved 91% and 
84% on-time performance respectively in 2015. 
Figure 1: On-time performance at a selection of UK airport in 2015 
Source: The Telegraph (2016) OAG 2015 data 
While an airline like British Airways operates in many unrestricted or partially unrestricted markets 
officially, in reality its freedom to operate unrestricted and at the scheduled times it says it wants 
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to operate is still quite restrictive. In 2015 BA achieved a modest 76% on-time rating with its main 
base in London Heathrow, down from 77% in 2014. 
Airlines based in the UK have frequently lobbied the UK government for more, not less regulation 
on airports charges to ensure they are lower and reflective of airport costs (Regulated Asset Base - 
RAB). EasyJet, for instance, recently lobbied for a RPI-8.5% reduction in charges in June 2013 
contrary to the proposed increase by the airport of RPI+1% (easyJet, 2013). This difference was 
driven by analysis of LGWs RAB and investment plans completed by the Gatwick Airport 
Consultative Committee, which suggested that charges were too high at the time. On the other 
hand, easyJet as the largest operator at Gatwick (40%+ of all flights) combined with the 
stakeholder relationships built up over time between easyJet, the Gatwick ACC and the airport 
operator itself can create artificial barriers for other airlines that perhaps would want to push for a 
more differentiated airport product and would have been willing to pay additional airport charges 
for it. While a carrier such as easyJet seemingly operates is a very liberal Single Aviation Market in 
Europe, it is evident that they still have to fight hard to ensure that they do not face other non-
ASA barriers to natural expansion and growth, whether it be through the actions of their privately 
owned airport partners or the regulatory action of the UK government (and CAA). 
Airport Performance Charters also act as a non-ASA barrier to entry for some carriers. In response 
to a South East Airport Task Force report draft, two CAA airline members expressed concerns that 
it would be disproportionate for a charter to include services  supplied by airlines  in  the  absence  
of  a  market  failure; that  a  charter  could  itself  actually distort the market by preventing service 
differentiation; and that airlines  were  also  subject  to  direct  consumer  regulation  such  as  
EU261 (Passenger Right Legislation), which can be enforced in the event of failure. Perhaps most 
concerning of all, the charter concept was deemed to  be  straying  from  the  original  intention  of  
protocols  during  periods  of  temporary  capacity  reduction  into  subjective micro-management, 
and the airport potentially interfering with airline/customer relations or imposing requirements 
unilaterally on airlines through the airport ‘Conditions of Use’ (CAA, 2012). Such issues raised by 
airline partners have led to a mixed response by airports in the South-East in terms of rolling out 
Airport Passenger Charters fully and serve to highlight the delicate balancing act the CAA has to 
perform in the carrying out of its Civil Aviation Act derived regulatory powers. It is clear that the 
UK CAA is reluctant to do anything that infringes on its stated objective of promoting market 
driven competition between airlines and between airports.  
4.2 Tanzania 
According to the ASAP database Tanzania is party to only 23 separate bilateral agreements with an 
overall Air Liberalisation Index of 11.4 out of a possible 50.  Interestingly one of their most liberal 
agreements is with the UK (ALI = 26), first signed in 1980 and updated on a number of occasions 
with the most recent version being signed in 2004. It is also the busiest country-pair market to 
from Tanzania with annual traffic in the 100,000-500,000 range (ASAP, 2016). No agreements with 
regional partners are covered by the ASAP database, however, which indicates that they have 
been treated separately as extra-bilateral agreements or have simply not been properly registered 
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with the ICAO World Air Service Agreements database from which the WTO ASAP database is 
extracted. This is itself can lead to some ambiguity in the de facto policy level between bilateral or 
multilateral partners. 
4.2.1. Inconsistency examples and implications for air carriers 
As far back as 2006, it was agreed as part of the East African Community (EAC) trading bloc work 
into the liberalisation of air services, that Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda would have harmonised 
and full liberal traffic rights for carriers operating between the three countries in line with the 
Yamoussoukro Decision (YD) (EAC, 2013). The reality experienced by individual air carriers has 
been markedly different, however, with specific ASA related barriers continuing to remain in 
effect. As recently as 2015, air carriers appear to have become the victims of tit-for-tat policy 
moves with Kenya Airways being the victim of a 2015 decision by the Tanzania Civil Aviation 
Authority to restrict access to all but three gateways in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and 
Kilimanjaro) in addition to the imposition of 60% frequency cuts and a clear specification of 
aircraft gauges permitted for Kenya Airways (Embraer 190 or Boeing 737-800). This move was 
evidently in response to a spate of restrictive moves by the Kenya Civil Authority to include the 
restriction of Tanzanian Tour Van to pick up passengers from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport 
in Nairobi (The Citizen, 2015). This is a classic example of inconsistency within ASAs and beyond 
ASAs, which when mixed together translate into significant barriers to entry for air carriers, 
regardless of official statements of progress made by respective Ministries of Transport and 
regional trading bloc officials. In fact for Kenya Airways, this policy shift represented a forced 67% 
capacity cut on all routes to Tanzania, irrespective of passenger/cargo demand or possible effects 
on efficiencies, fares and overall service levels. Kenya Airways had to find a short terms solution to 
redeploy capacity on to other routes (The Citizen, 2015).  
The second case that illustrates policy inconsistencies relates to Low-Cost Carrier FastJet. It has 
been widely reported that efforts to obtain Aircraft Operating Certificates both in its base country 
Tanzania and in neighbouring countries have been needlessly long and drawn out. This is then 
followed by a similar unexplained delay in the processing of traffic rights (CAPA, 2014). 
Protectionism of national carriers appears to be the driver of such moves in Tanzania, Zambia, 
South Africa among others, where job security of national airlines take precedence over consumer 
demand for low-cost, low-fare travel and some level of competition. FastJet Tanzania was 
repeatedly blocked by the Kenyan Civil Aviation Authority from operating a dual designation on 
routes such as Dar es Salam-Nairobi, - Mombasa, Kilimanjaro-Nairobi and Zanzibar-Nairobi. This 
was primarily due to the fact that incumbent carrier Kenya Airways would have to face some low-
cost competition on the previously monopolistic routes. If linked with the previous example, it 
becomes clear that the tit-for-tat policy shifts between Tanzania and Kenya have had a long 
history (CAPA, 2014). The practise of employing delay tactics or adding additional layers of 
bueracracy are tried and tested non-ASA barriers to entry, which have clearly been exercised in 
relation to ambitious LCCs such as FastJet. Tanzania, one of the first countries to take a liberal 
approach towards the setting up of new LCCs have not backed this up with their approach towards 
liberal ASA negotiations with neighbouring countries, which inadvertently come back to bite home 
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based carriers such as FastJet when neighbouring countries also tighten their ASA and non-ASA 
restrictions. 
Other non-ASA barriers that have been widely reported in Tanzania include delays and refusals to 
grant self-handling status and the use of Airports Authorities (the TAA in this case) to create 
barriers to entry by, for instance, delaying the building of taxiways to new air carrier facilities in an 
effort to disrupt progress towards the commencement of new competitive or non-competitive 
routes. The latter can be especially prevalent if the airport operator is owned and/or controlled by 
a protectionist government or in some way has an incentive economic or otherwise to offer 
preferential treatment to incumbent carriers. All of the above non-ASA barriers were deployed in 
in 2011 in the case of newly privatised carrier Precision Air, which had a minority Kenyan 
shareholding (Thome, 2001). While on the face of it the states Tanzanian policy has been 
seemingly liberal towards air carrier privatisation and liberalisation, it is evident that the reality 
faced by new entrant or even incumbent carriers can be quite different due to the imposition of 
non-ASA barriers or due to a departure from officially stated ASA terms based primarily on 
protectionist motivations. 
5. Conclusions and suggested next steps 
This study sought to highlight some continuing gaps in the assessment of commercial air policies. 
The UK and Tanzania cases, though not comprehensive, have served to illustrate the continued 
paradoxes and ambiguities that exist in the formulation and implementation of commercial air 
policies and the difficulties such inconsistencies can present for new entrant and incumbent air 
carriers.  
Moves towards creating a quantifiable index in relation to ASAs has certainly been a step forward 
in assessing the impact of liberalisation and it was positive to see the work of researchers and 
theorists work their way into ICAO and the World Trade Organisations with official Air Service 
Indices being created to be used by policy makers, practitioners and researchers alike.  
This research highlights, however, the sheer quantity of work that is still left to be completed in 
this area and, though additional anecdotal and quantitative evidence is required, the findings 
shown in this study already point towards the need to create a more holistic, all-encompassing 
index that would take account of official ASA versus de facto ASA policy differences, an exhaustive 
list of non-ASA barriers and a fuller scope to take in all world regions, aviation supply chain 
distortions (airports and other suppliers), and a complete range of air services (passenger, cargo 
only, charter etc.). 
The selection of case countries in this study also allow for a comparison of how policy 
consistencies play out in each country. In the case of the UK, many of the continued barriers 
appear to centre of airports and airport capacity and how that is managed and translated into 
regulations that may or may not represent barriers to entry. This type of situation could be more 
representative of developed, mature air transport markets, though the planning situation and 
chronic lack of land space for expansion would be more unique to the UK and west European cases 
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than for advanced air transport markets elsewhere. In the case of Tanzania it was found that 
departures from stated policies (e.g. liberalisation and privatisation) can often fly in the face of 
protectionist sentiments. This type of situation can be more reflective of growing, infant markets 
where policy makers face the uncertainty of growth forecasts materialising or not and whether 
national interests (e.g. national airlines), should benefit most from additional demand even if 
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